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NOTES
THE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED ON A
FORGED CHECJ.
It has long been recognized that, where a bank pays a
check upon a forged indorsenient, the bank is the loser; neither
the drawer nor the payee is prejudiced by the act. And this
rule is in no way altered by the fact that the bank making the
payment is not the drawee of the check, but merely discounts
it, and afterwards collects from the drawee. "As the non-
drawee bank is under no obligation whatever to pay, it does*
so at its peril; this is a well-known rule."' The interesting
12 Bolles, Banks and Banking (igo7), p. 7.1A
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question arises when the attempt is made to fasten the loss
upon the bank which dealt with the forger: is the only action
that of the drawee bank to recover the money which it has
paid, or has the payee of the check a remedy, either upon the
instrument or collateral to it, directly against the collector
bank?
The general rule may be stated to be, that in the absence of
some form of acceptance by the bank, there is no action upon
the check against it, in the name of the holder of the instru-
ment.2 A New York case8 has allowed recovery under such
circumstances, where the payee, before bringing suit, pro-
cured an assignment of all the rights of the drawer, but this
goes rather upon the principle of assignment of a chose in
action than upon any remedy under the law merchant. Another
form of action was, however, suggested by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the opinion in Bank v. Millard, io Wall.
152. "It may be," reads the dictum, "if it could be shown that
the bank had charged the check on its books against the drawer,
and settled with him on that basis, that the plaintiff could
recover on the count for money had and received, on the
grounds that the rule ex acquo et bono would be applicable, as
the bank, having assented to the- order, and communicated its
assent to the paymaster (the drawer) would be considered as
holding the money thus appropriated to the plaintiff's use, and,
therefore, under an implied promise to pay it on demand."
The quasi-contractual action here suggested has been brought
in a great many cases,4 with successful results, and it seems to
be now a well-settled rule of law, that i'ecovery will be allowed
upon this form of pleading wherever it appears that the
defendant may charge the payment made to the forger, to the
drawee bank." "If a negotiable instrument having a forged
indorsement comes to the hands of a bank and is collected by
it, the proceeds are held for the rightful owners of the paper,
and may be recovered by them, although the bank gave value
Btank of the Ref'tbllc v. Millard, to Wall. 152 (786p); First National
Bank of IVashington v. JVhitna', 94 U. S. 343 (t8,5); Saylor v.
Bushong. too Pa. 23 (1882).
' ldler v. Brc.adway Bank of Brooklyn, 30 N. Y. Misc. 382 (igoo).
' Buckley v. Bank of Jersey City, 35 N. J. Law 400 (1872); Farmer v.
Bank. too Tenn. 187 (1807); Bobbett v. Pinckett, .4 L T. Rep. 85i
(1876); Shaffer v. McKee, i9 Ohio 5-6 (iSr9); Talbot v. Bank of
Rochester, i MRi1. -"95 (1841).
'Clark v. Warren Savings Bank, 31 Pa. Superior Ct. 647 (19o6).
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for the paper, or has paid over the proceeds to the party de-
positing the instrument for collection."
The question came before the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania ii the case of Tibby "Brothers Glass Co. v. Farmers' and
lechanics' Bank of Sharpsburg, 22o Pa. x. The plaintiff, who
had an account with the defendant, had been in the habit- of
indorsing checks for deposit, though not for cashing, with a
rubber stamp. A bookkeeper of plaintiff indorsed several
checks drawn to plaintiff's order by customers on other banks,
and defendant paid him cash for them, and collected them in
due course from the drawee banks. Plaintiff, upon discovering
the forgery, procured the checks from their customers, and
brought assumpsit for money had and received to their use,
against defendant, presenting the cancelled checks as evidence.
The Court denied relief, Judge Mestrezat basing his opinion
,Ipon the grounds, first, that under the law of Pennsylvania,
plaintiff would have no right of action against the drawee
banks, and second, because the drawee banks can recover from
tile defendant the money paid it by them on the forged checks;
hence it cannot be held to have been "received by defendant to
the use of plaintiff."
The interesting feature about this decision is, that in Seventh
National Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483 (1873) the Court had
allowed recovery in this action, where the" transaction was
confined to one bank-that is, A drew the check on the X bank
to the order of B; C, B's clerk, forged B's name. and drew
the money from the bank, which thereupon charged the check
to A. B procured the check from A and recovered against .
the bank.
The decisions in these two cases, arising under almost
precisely similar facts, would seem to point out the test in
each instance as to whether or not the quasi-contractual action
may be maintained by the holder of the check. If the drawer
submits to a charging of the wrongful payment against his
account, the remedy reverts to the holder, and the rule of Bank
v. Cook would be followed; whereas, if as in the Tibby case,
there is no assurance that defendant will not be proceeded
against by the drawees or the draxer as the circumstances
may permit, and on the other hand every assurance that some
such action will be brought, the holder will be denied relief,
0 M orse, Banks and Banking, S. 24&
'First National Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 (i86).
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and sent back to his action on the original contract against
the drawer, his customer or debtor.
This last remedy is always open to him, for it has been
universally held. that none of the transactions with 'espect to
the forged paper amounts to a "payment" in the technical
sense of the term.
THE RiGiT OF A TiiiRD PARTY TO SUE ON A CONTRAcT.
The right of a third party to sue on a contract, made for
his benefit but to which he was not a party, has been recognized
so often and by so many jurisdictions, that it seems there must
be sonie consistent principle on which to base it. The concen-
sus of opinion of the textwriters, however, treats it as an
anomaly. Certain well recognized transactions must be dis-
tingui~hed. Whenever property is delivered to one man with
an obligation attached to the specific property conveyed or
delivered, in favor of a third person, there is no difficulty in
giving the latter a right to bring an action in his own name.
The facts might show, either that the legal title Was conveyed
with an equitable obligation attached in favor of a cestui que
trust, or that the legal title passed direct to the third party, by
the transaction, and that the promisor became a bailee to deliver
-as, ior example, delivery of goods to a carrier in fulfillment
of a contract to sell. In both of the above cases there is an
obligation attached to the specific property conveyed. The
right o; action in the beneficiary is not based upon contract,
but upon a property right. The same. transaction creates a
contract right in the promisee and a property right in the bene-
ficiary. In the case of Harrington v. Green, 1o7 N. Y. Supp.
403 (Nov., i9o7), the defendant received a check from
the pronisce for $372---$82-44 of which was for the plaintiff.
No reasons were given to sustain the recovery allowed. Nor
did the facts show whether the defendant was to pay the plain-
tiff out of the proceeds of the check. If such was the case, the
defendant was clearly a trustee of an undivided moiety for the
plaintiff.
The difficulty arises when the promisor receives property,
with no obligations attached to the specific res, hut upon a
promise to pay out of general assets, a sum certain to a third
party. The latter may or may not be the sole beneficiary-
premiums are paid by an insured to an insurance company,
which promises to pay a sum certain to a named beneficiary.
A mortgagor conveys land to B, who promises to pay the debt
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of the mortgage to the mortgagee. ;A corporation deposits
money in a baik to meet the coupons on its bonds, and the bank
promises to pay the coupon holders. A parent gives property-
real or personal-inter i.os or by WillI-to a son upon his
promise to pay certain sums to the daughter. A retiring
partner assigns his interest to the remaining partners, who
promise to pay the debts of the partnership. A debtor, conveys
his business to B, who promises to pay the creditors--ii none
of the above cases has the beneficiary any property right in the
specific res conveyed, because in every case the promise is
to pay out of general assets. Nor can there be-any recovery
based upon the doctrine of consideration and special promise,
because the consideration does not move from the plaintiff.
There is neither an assignment" of a chose in action, nor a nova-
tion. Yet the increasingly large number of decisions permittmg
the beneficiary to recover' show, that whatever may be the
apparent technical difficulties, justice requires some remedy
to be given to the beneficiary. "Fair expectations should not
be disippointed."' An exhaustive search of the early caimnon
law authorities show, that formerly, such a transaction gave
rise to a debt. 3 There is a quid pro quo and a promise to pay
a sum certain. A contract between the plaintiff and the defend-
ant was not necessary to sustain an action of debt.' The action
of debt has been said to be obsolete. It seems that its useful-
ness is still required.
But there is no principle of the common law on which to base
an action by the beneficiary, where there has been no quid pro
quo, but only a special promise.
Two fathers, whose children have intermarried, promise to
each other to pay to the son a marriage portion. The son
attempts to enforce the promises in his own name He has
suffered no detriment, nor is there a debt. A doctrine permit-
ting a recovery in such a case, is an anomaly. If the line is to
be drawn somewhere, this seems to be the plam
'The decisions for and against recovery are exhaustively treated in
an article by Mr. Samuel Williston, entitled "Contracts for the Benefit
of Third Persons," in XV Harvard- Law. Review, 767, s902.
'"Law: Its Origin, Growth and Futcton" by James C. Carter, at
bottom of page i8.
'See articles by Mr. Crawford D. Hening. entitled Onhe .imitations
of the Action of As.umpsit as Affecting the Right of Action of the
Beneficiary," in American Law Register, VoL 52, p. 759; VoL 5, p. itX
and VoL 6. p. 73.
:Starkey v. Mill, Styles 296 (6sx).
'Tweddle v. Atkinson, x B. & S. 393 (z861).
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SECTION 724 REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES
AUTHORIZING PRODUCTION BEFORE TRIAL.
This section 724 was originally .enacted September 24, 1789.
The meaning of the words "books or writings * * * which
contain evidence pertinent to the issue in cases and under cir-
cumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same
by ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery," seems to be easily
ascertainable by referring to the practice of the English High
Court of Chancery upon a bill in equity for discovery of an
adversary's documents in aid of an action at law.
It was a matter of common knowledge among English and
American lawyers in 1789 that after an action at law was begun
either plaintiff or defendant could by an auxiliary bill in chan-
cery obtain product.on in advance of trial of such of the oppo-
nent's documents as tended to prove "the case" at law of the
party filing the bill. Such of the documents as were not privi-
lcged were ordered to be produced by the defendant and lodged
with one of "the six clerks" of chancery, with leave to the
plaintiff to r ake copies. The answer and the doctiments as
above produced werz subsequently used in the trial at law.
Chancery commonly stayed the proceedings at law by injunc-
tion until the pioper discovery of documents was bbtained.1
Production and inspection of documents in advance of the
trial at law, being the familiar practice in chancery when the
above statute of i789 was enacted, the manifest intention of
Congress was to economize the time of litigants at law by
dispensing with the tedious and useless formality of filing an
auxiliary bill in equity for discovery of documents before the
Circuit Judge in his capacity of chancellor and then, after
thus obtaining production and inspection of the documents, of
requiring the answer and documents to be transported to the
law side of the Circuit Court and there to be read in evidence.
When Congress enacted the words of the Judiciary Act of
1789: "Sec. IS. And be it further enacted, That all the said
courts of the United States shall have power in the trial of
actions at law on motions, &c.," we must assume that this
body was familiar with the chancery practice of granting
production before trial in the case of actions at law. If
therefore the Congress was aware of that practice and did
' Sm th v. Duke of Beaufort, i Hare 507 (j842) ; - v. The Cor-
poration of Exeter, 2 Vescy, Sr. 62o (1755) ; Langdell on Eq. Pr. (2nd
Ed.) 242; Reynolds v. Burgess Co., 71 N. H. 332.
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not wish to adopt it we should expect that words expressly
limiting the right of production to the actual date of the trial
would have been substituted for the above very general lan-
guage which may refer quite as readily to the c-itir, procedure
of a common law action as to the particular day of trial.
. In contrast to the strong current of judicial authority inter-
preting this section so as to allow production before trial, a
contrary view has been entertained by certain judges-by Cur-
tis, J., in !asigi v. Browzn, I Curtis 4o2 (x853) ; by Clifford, J.,
in Merchants' National Batik v. State National Bank, 3 Clifford
201 (1868); by Green, D. J., in U. S. v. National Lead Co.,
75 Fed. 94 (1896). These decisions are based upon the follow-
ing reasons:. Judge Curtis was impressed by the argument
that "it would occupy time unnecessarily, and it might be very
difficult to decide before hand, whether a paper was pertinent
to the issue, and whether it was so connected with the case,
that a Court of Equity would compel its production." To this
reasoning the reply would appear sufficient that the Federal
Court can only act after a hearing upon notice and after receiv-
ing such evidence in the form of affidavits and counter-affi-
davits as give the like information respecting the relevancy of
the documents sought as chancery has always required and
acted upon when a motion for production of documents was
based upon the answer. Judge Clifford's interpretation makes
much account of the provision that the penalty of disobedience
is not immediate attachment for contempt, as in the case of
disobedience to an order for production of documents, but is a
non-suit or a default. It would seem, however, perfectly con-
sistent with the main purpose of the statute, viz., to require
production of documents "under circumstances where they
might bb compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules
of proceeding in chancery," that the documents could be
ordered to be produced before the trial and, if the order is dis-
obeyed, the statutory punishment of default or non-suit could
be imposed at the trial. The reasoning of Green, D. J., seems
to rest vpon a mistaken idea of the phraseology of the act, as
the Pidge cites the act as containing the words, "'On the trial
of any action." But the words in reality are "in the.trial."
In accord with the recent decision of Shaefer v. Int. Power
Co., 157 Fed. 896 (Circuit Court So. Dist. of New York), see
post p. 354, and supporting the interpretation of Sec. P4 advo-
cated in this note see: Cent. Nat. Bank v. Tayloe, 2 Crach. C. C.
427; Jacques v. Collins, 2 Blatchf. 23; Gregory v. Chicago R.
Co., jo Fed. R. 529; Luchcr v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 67 Fed. x8;
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Boede Co. v. Bancroft and Son, 98 Fed. 15. One of the fun-
damental reasons for permitting discovery in chancery was
economy of time in preparing for and trying issues of fact. To
give production only at the trial under Sec. 724 would defeat
this fundamental object of giving production. See Lord Mon-
tague v. Dudinan, 2 Ves. Sen. 398; Brereton v. Ganlul, 2 Atk.
240; Earl of Glengall v. Fraser, 2 Hare 99.
"VoLENTI NON FrT INJURIA" As APPLIED TO PERSONS RIDING
IN ExposED PLACES ON STRErr RAILWAY CARS.
The cases relating to the rights of persons occupying exposed
places on street railway cars, while generally placed on the
ground of contributory negligence, are more properly to be
referred to the doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk Con-
tributory negligence involves the idea of misconduct, a failure to
measure up to the standard of care of the average man. Volun-
tary assumption of risk may exist, although the risk would be
incurred by the man of ave.age carefulness.' Thus, the aver-
age man would stand on the rear platform of a car, although
in so doing he may well be held to take the risks (if certain
dangers that are necessarily incident to that position, such as
injuries caused by the normal swaying of tile car. Adopting
therefore the principle of "z'olnti non fit injuria" in this class
of cases we should expect in general to find that a plaintiff is
not barred because of his exposed position on a car unless (x)
he has volnntarily taken such position, and (2) the injury which
he has suffered is one that is peculiarly incidental to that posi-
tion.
The necessity of transportation has in general been held suffi-
cient t6 render the taking of the exposed position not voluntary.
Thus, it is universally held that a passenger may occupy the
platform or runningboard (of an open car) when the inside of
the car is crowded ;2 and in the latter case the company owes
him a di'ty of protection from the negligence of their servants,
'For a it,!- discn,.io-a of the doctrine of volumtary assumption of
risk. see article by Fran.is H. Bohlen, Esq., 2o Harvard Law Review,
P. 14.
' For reference to Pcnnsylvania cases, see '. & L Dig. of Decis.
Col. 22515.
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for example, from a collision with another car, or from collision
with a wagon standing in the street which was seen by the
niotorman, 3 but not from collisions with wagons where there
was no negligence on the part of the motorman.6
The urgency of transportation, however, is not sufficient to
prevent the occupation being voluntary when the place is so
dangerous that injury must almost necessarily result; thus,
where a person standing on the bumper of a car was struck
in a rear-end collision,' or where a person took his position
outside the guard-rail of an open summer car and was struck
by a crowd of persons occupying a similar position on .a car
going in the other direction.'
The cases that present greater difficulty and in which there
is some divergence of authority are those where a passenger
occupies the platform of a car when there is sitting or standing
room inside. According to the current of authority such a per-
son is not barred from recovery,' although the intimation is that
if there were a rule of the company prohibiting persons riding
on the platform, notice of which was brought home to the
passenger, the result would be otherwise.' This result seems
in harmony with the principles governing the doctrine of
assumption of risk. It would seem that the doctrine should
prevent recovery when the injury results from the mere normnl
swaying of the cars, or even from negligence of persons getting
on and off the cars. The Pennsylvania cases, however, have
developed a rule which is contrary to the general current of
authority. It is held that to ride on the platform of an electric
car is negligence per se, which bars recovery for an injury
received through the negligence of the company.' Several
reasons may be assigned for this conclusion. (i) The courts"
of this State have distinguished between the case of persons
riding on the platform of a horse car and that of persons riding
on the platform of an electric car;1O this distinction seems
' Bunbear v. United Traction Co., 198 Pa. r9&
See infra, report of the recent case.
PBard %. Pa. Traction Co., 176 Pa. 97. (There being no evidence that
lie was secit by the motorman of the following car.)
I ardinq v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 217 Pa. 69.
Dohan v. Ry., 87 N. Y. 63; Uphain v. Detroit Ry., 85 Mich. Y2.
'North Chicago Ry. v. Brown, 179 111. 126.
'Thayne v. Traction Co., 191 Pa. 251.
"See langunge of Chief Justice Mitchell in the last cited case, and
Ry. v. Boudron, 92 Pa. 47.
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anomalous. (2) It is an unconscious application of a tendency
that exists in the Pennsylvania courts in negligence cases to
lay down artificial standards of care,' and to select some phys-
ical fact as conclusively indicative of absence of care. 12 (3)
It is submitted that the result reached by the courts of this
State results in part from a misunderstanding of the doctrine
of voluntary assumption in risk. The real question under the
doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk is, what is the danger
that is nornally to be anticipated from the position taken up.
Manifestly a man in standing on the back platform of a car
does not take "upon himself the risk of his position from any
cause."O
Certainly, no court would hold that where a car fell through
a bridge whose defective condition was due to the negligence
of the trolley company, and all persons on board were over-
whelmcd in the common disaster, that the plaintiff could not
recover because he was standing on the platform. So, in lesser
degree, while a person in taking his position on the platform
may be held to assume the risk of injuries due to the swaying
and jolting of the car, and the crowding of passengers, he
should not, it is submitted, be held to take the risk of a rear-end
collision.
In the recent case of Hyde v. Seattle Electric Co. (93 Pac.
903) the plaintiff descended to the step of an open summer car
when less than a block from home. A wagon which was pro-
ceeding parallel to the car suddenlr swerved aside and injured
the plaintiff. The decision in favor of the defendant seems in
accord with the principles developed above, for conceding the
plaintiff was rightfully on the runningboard of the car, there
was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company.
Thus, the case is distinguished from the case cited above when
a wagon was standing in the street and where the collision
could have been averted by care on the part of the motorman.'
"L e., not the standard of the average man, but a standard imposed
by the court.TCf. necessity of "stopping" in level crossing accidents; also that
the stopping of a car is a prerequisite to recovery in case of an injury
sustained by a person leaving a car. The reason for this tendency is to
require evidence which is easy of ascertainment by witnesses.
WHETHER IN ESTIMATING THE REASONABLENESS OF RATES
PRESCRIBED-FOR PASSENGER TRAFFIC THE COURT SiOULD
TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE EARNINGS DERIvED FROM
PASSENGER TRAFFIC ONLY, OR SituOw TAKE INTO CON-
SIDERATION THE EARNINGS FROM BOTH FREIGHT AND
PASSENGER TRAFFIC.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in declaring uncon--
stitutional an act of the Legislature fixing two cents as the
maximum fare per mile for transportation of passengers on
railroads in that State, so far as it relates to the plaintiff com-
pany, holds that a carrier is entitled to earn a net income not
less than the legal rate of interest, plus a sum sufficient to pay
fixed charges, operating expenses, cost of maintaining the
plant, and providing for a sinking fund for the payment of
debts, besides a fair profit to the owners; and that in determin-
ing whether passenger rates are unreasonable or unjust, the
passenger traffic of the road should be considered separate and
distinct from the freight traffic.' There are strong dissenting
opinions, which take the view that the earnings from all the
branches of the business should be considered as a basis of fix-
ing a rate for passenger traffic which would conform to the
test of reasonableness above laid down.
It is well settled that a State may regulate the rates of a busi-
ness affected with a public use ;2 and this may be done either
through the medium of the Legislature or of a commission.2
Such regulation, however, is subject to review by the courts,
and whether the rates are so unreasonable as to operate to
deprive the arrier of its property without due process of law,
becomes a judicial question ultimately, although it may be
primarily a legislative question.4
The test of reasonableness applied by the United States
Supreme Court has been whether or not the rate permits a fair
return on all the property of the carrier used for the conveni-
ence of the public," and while the cases have arisen chiefly upon
' P. R. R. Co. v. Phil. County, 68 Atd. Rep. 676 (r9o8).
'Afutin v. Ill., 94 U. S. 113 (1876); A. Coast Line v. N. C. Corp.
Corn., 2o6 U. S. I (i9o6).
'R. R. Com. Cas., II6 U. S. 307 (1886); Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T.
Co., 154 U. S. at 393 (1893); Af. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Minin., 186 U. S.
257 (1902).
'AM., St. P. & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Afinn., 134 U. S. 418 (z89o).
IReagan v. Farmers' L & T. Co., t54 U. S. 362 (1893); Stnyth v.
Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (j897).
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questions involving freight rates,6 still the most positive declara-
tions of the Supreme Court upon the subject have been in
cases which involved passenger as well as freight rates.7 The
same test has been adopted by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission.6
It has been held, also, that a carrier is not justified in charg-
ing an unduly high rate over a particular line which is a part
of a great system, merely because that particular line fails to
pay expenses,9 and the right of a State to compel a railroad
company to run a particular train for the convenience of the
public, even though it entailed a pecuniary loss upon the com-
pany, has been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 0
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that in de-
termining the reasonableness of a State regulation of intra-
state traffic, all consideration of interstate traffic should be
excluded, and that the intrastate rate should be so fixed as to
afford a fair return to the carrier upon the capital invested in
that branch of its business regardless of the income from inter-
state traffic."1 The bald question of separating the freight and
passenger rates and the right of the carrier to secure a fair
return upon each without regard to the return upon the other,
seems, however, not to have been as yet presented to the
Supreme Court for adjudication. The attitude of that court
toward the question cannot be anticipated with certainty, but
the cases cited incline, upon principle, toward th. minority
view in the principal case.
"M., St. P. & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Minx., i34 U. S. 418 (i89o); C. &
N. IV. R. R. Co. v. Dey, 35 Fed. Rep. 866 (i888) ; Ames v. U. Pac. Ry.
Co., 64 Fed. Rep. i6s (1894); No. Dakota Rate Cas., 91 Fed. Rep. 47
(1898).
' . 'f., etc., Ry. Co. v. Tompkins., 176 U. S. iSo (18W); Ga. R. R.,
etc., Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174 (i88); Reagan v. Fartners' L. T . Co.,
154 U. S. 362 (1893); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1897).
'Brabh om v. Ati. Coast Line, ii Interst. Coin. Rep. 464 (t905); Art
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., zi Interst. Comn. Rep. 458 (igo5).
I Interst. Com. Cons. v. R. R. Co., 1i8 Fed. Rep. 613 (902).
"At. Coast Line v. N. C. Corp. Coin., 2o6 U. S., i (i9o6).
"Snyth v. Aties, 169 U. S. 466 (i',97); No. Dakota Rate Cas., 91
Fed. Rep. 47 (1898).
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